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DEFENSE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AS PORTRAYED IN THREE TRIALS: EICHMANN, CALLEY AND ENGLAND
For centuries of its existence mankind has engaged in the history of many bloody
and hideous wars. However, people have come to realization that it is necessary to
regulate the actions during the armed conflict and therefore since the early stages there
have existed certain rules of conduct during the armed conflicts. To violate these rules
means to cross an essential borderline of civilized and acceptable behavior. Such
violations have been viewed as intolerable. When the time comes to prosecute grave
violations of war fare; the perpetrators resort to the defenses, available to them, mostly in
their attempts to avoid criminal responsibility or hoping at least to mitigate their
punishment. Among such defenses is the defense of superior orders. In my research I
would like to consider some critical issues that arise in connection with the superior
orders doctrine as well as the attempts to use such defense in the three trials, - trial of
Eichmann, trial of William Calley and the most recent of them, - Lynndie England’s
trial.
In the Peleus case (In re Eck and Others) the Judge Advocate makes the following
observation. “…superior orders…coming from a higher authority which the accused is by
the law and custom of his service obliged to obey…”1 Another attempt to define the
doctrine was offered by Howard Levie who suggest that “defense of superior orders …
[is] the claim that the accused did what he did because of he was ordered to do so by a
superior officer (or by his Government) and that his refusal to obey the order would have
brought dire consequences upon him.” 2 From these definitions we can see that the
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superior orders doctrine is inseparably connected with the idea of obligation to obey
higher authority due to the nature of one’s service and possible consequences of
disobedience. This reflects the inherent link of superior orders with a number of other
concepts and problems essential in the consideration of the superior orders doctrine.
These problems include: difficulty in detecting the unlawfulness in superior orders
further complicated by the training practices that prepare soldiers not to question the
orders of their superior officers; principle of moral choice and personal perception by
each individual soldier regarding the received order; the limitations and requirements for
the application of a superior orders defense.
First I will consider the question when superior orders can be regarded as
unlawful. In the military service, starting with such initial stages as training, the soldiers
are taught to obey the orders of their commanders. It is being planted into the minds of
the young recruits that they must follow orders. Rogers points out in his book, that
military efficiency “depends on the prompt and unquestioning obedience of orders to
such an extent that soldiers are prepared to put their lives at risk in executing these
orders” 3. The author contends that “it is vital to the cohesion and control of a military
force in dangerous and intolerable circumstances that commanders should be able to give
orders and require their subordinates to carry them out” 4 Rogers’s statement is similar to
one of Colonel Kennedy, the presiding military Judge in the famous U.S. v. Calley case,
where Colonel stated: “Soldiers are taught to follow orders. And special attention is given
to orders on the battlefield. Military effectiveness depends upon obedience to orders.” 5
In addition, what complicates the situation is that the soldiers are trained to presume that
all the orders of their superiors are legal by default. Author Leslie Green quotes the
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following statement from a proposal on superior orders: “There shall be a presumption
that all orders issued by superiors to their subordinates are in fact legal” 6 Unfortunately,
it has been proven by quite a significant number of appalling instances throughout the
history of mankind and warfare that superior orders may be unlawful. What are the
criteria for the determination for each individual soldier to find such an order unlawful?
International criminal law scholars developed a number of key definitions that could help
in the making of such determination. “When the order is grossly illegal” is the suggestion
by Justice Solomon from R. v. Smith case 7. Another early example is the McCall v.
McDowell case8, where the court offers the following criterion: “…where at first blush it
is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the order is illegal…” 9 In
Llandovery Castle case the court talks about the universally known illegality of some
orders: “ The firing on the boats was an offense against the law of nations…The rule of
international law, which is here involved, is simple and universally known” 10. Paust and
other authors of this textbook suggest that it was Professor Yoram Dinstein who
developed the method to determine whether the soldier knew that the order amounted in a
criminal act. 11 This method is known as the auxiliary test of manifest illegality, or “the
manifest illegality principle”; and according to Paust and other authors, this principle
received extensive acceptance on the international level. 12 The underlying statement is
that military orders must be obeyed unless they are manifestly unlawful. Such an order is
the one that “offends the conscience of every reasonable, right thinking person; it must be
an order which is obviously and flagrantly wrong.” 13 In his book Dinstein quotes two
other authors who expressed the gist of the principle, one being Maugham who stated that
“A superior order should not be a defense if the act constituting the alleged crime was
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clearly and obviously one of a criminal kind.” 14 The other author, Cave, in reference to
the principle said that it “limits the impunity of the soldier to cases where the orders are
not so manifestly illegal that he must or ought to have known that they were unlawful.” 15
The principle of the test is that a subordinate should incur responsibility for his act if he
commits a crime pursuant to a manifestly illegal order, and should be released from guilt
if he commits an offense in obedience with an order the illegality of which is not
palpable.16 Dinstein points out that the illegality test is “objective in its character and is
based on the intelligence of the reasonable man” 17. To explore the test’s rationale
Dinstein poses two hypotheticals: in the first one the soldier committed an international
offense following the order not manifestly illegal from the point of view of a reasonable
man. However, the offender himself knows that his act is criminal. Another issue is if a
soldier committed a criminal act which is manifestly illegal for any reasonable man, but
due to his personal inadequate intellectual abilities, he himself is not aware of the
illegality of his act. Llandovery Castle case, according to the author, is the example of the
practical application of this principle. 18 He applies the rule set out by this case stating
that even if the order does not reach the degree of the manifest illegality, the person
committing the act will be held criminally responsible if he himself was aware of its
illegality. In light of this determining factor, the hypothetical where the soldier commits
an act not manifestly illegal to a reasonable man, but himself is aware of such illegality,
he will be held criminally liable. Likewise, in the second hypothetical, if the subordinate
commits an act in pursuance of a superior order, and such act is manifestly illegal, but for
some reason the offender does not know about the act’s illegality, he will not be liable.
Dinstein then suggests the formulation that “an accused should not be held responsible,
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under international law, for a criminal act executed in obedience to a superior order if he
committed the act without being aware of its illegality”. 19 The author calls this
substantive principle ‘the personal knowledge principle.’ However, as Dinstein points
out, such principle contradicts the famous maxim ‘ignorantia juris non excusat’, the
maxim, reaffirmed by Castren “ignorance of legal rules and failure to discover their
content does not…relieve a person of responsibility”. 20 Some legal scholars respond to
that by noting that it is the manifestly illegal orders that are prevalent in the context of
international criminal law. 21 Indeed the examples I will consider in further discussion
represent situations that particularly deal with such manifestly illegal orders.
To conclude discussion regarding the definitions of the illegality of superior
orders I would like to mention another prominent point of view. A remarkable, in my
opinion, statement in this regard belongs to Judge Halevy in the decision for the Kafr
Qassem case (Appeal, 279-283-58 Psakim, Judgments of the District Court of Israel,
vol.44, at p.362) 22 where he compares manifest unlawfulness of the order with the black
flag which waves over the illegal order saying it is forbidden. He further talks about
“certain and obvious unlawfulness that stems from the order itself, the criminal
character,…unlawfulness that pierces and agitates the heart, if the eye is not blind nor the
heart closed or corrupt.” (Id, p. 362) 23 This statement clearly indicates that subordinates
are provided with a rather simple choice to make regarding the lawfulness of the order.
The criteria are based on the rational human standards and qualities of any given
reasonable individual. Thus even in the time of the most severe and destructive military
conflict there are certain values that prevail and consideration of these basic human
values should shelter some categories that sometimes can get drawn into military action.
6
In conclusion I would like to suggest that taking into consideration the discussion
of the above points of view, we can clearly determine that in some circumstances the
illegality of the superior orders is so manifest that, in my opinion, such cases should not
make available the defense of superior orders to the criminals.
Now I will consider some particular examples where the perpetrators made
attempts to resort to the superior orders defense and what the outcome was in each of
these cases.
The first example is noteworthy in the history of the international criminal law
trial of Adolf Eichmann 24. The counsel for the Appellant in the Supreme Court of Israel
proposed the defense of obedience to superior orders claiming that Eichmann took the
oath of allegiance when he joined the SS and thus Hitler’s compulsion to destroy the
Jews completely was the order he received by his superior. 25 This order was, according
to the accused, passed to him through the organization’s chain of command and in his
action he was guided by his superior. The court rejects such contention declaring in
particular that “the defense that the act was done in obedience to superior orders
means…that the person who performed it had no alternative – either by law or virtue of
the regulations of the disciplinary body (army, etc.) of which he was a member – but to
carry out the order he received from his superior.” 26. The Judge, however, does not
accept such defense and says that such defense will render no result to the accused since
it is clear from the facts of the case that the accused acted independently and even
exceeded the tasks that were assigned to him through the official chain of command. 27
Furthermore, the court gives a thorough consideration of the superior orders and points
out 3 problems associated with it. The first issue is that for the purpose of the good order
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one should not disobey the commands of their superior. The second problem is that if the
soldier obeys the unlawful order, this will create substantial damage to the public, thus
the obedience should be only to the orders in which lawfulness the actor is convinced.
The third issue is the dilemma to obey or disobey, where the soldier if he makes the
wrong choice will either be brought to the court-martial (if he disobeys a lawful order) or
become punishable under international criminal law (if obeys an unlawful order).
Juxtaposing these issues the court in Eichmann case says these problems show that the
question whether to allow superior order defense depends on the mental state of the
accused at the time of the offense and in particular whether the offender knew about the
unlawful nature of the order. 28 The court establishes in accordance with the tendency
from the English law that “such defense is admissible where there was obedience to an
order not manifestly unlawful.” 29 Following the suggested criteria the court then declares
that the superior orders defense will be rejected for the accused for several reasons: 1).
The order for physical extermination was manifestly unlawful, and all other orders to
prosecute the Jews were contrary to the “basic ideas of law and justice”, and 2). The
accused was well aware at the time of committing his crimes that he was a party to the
perpetration of the most grave and horrible crimes. 30 To prove such knowledge the court
cites Eichmann’s own statements where he himself declares that in the extermination of
the Jews he sees “one of the gravest crimes in the history of the mankind” also admitting
that he had such realization when he committed the crimes: “I already at that time
realized that this… was something illegal, something terrible…” 31 However, Eichmann
also claims that he was under the oath of loyalty from which he was not released. 32 This
raises a question of a moral choice within the doctrine of superior orders. Did Eichmann,
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being who he was in the SS ranking system, have a moral choice? Would a reasonable
person being put to a similar test ever opt for the loyalty to the organization the purpose
of which is not only manifestly unlawful, but such that on its face is against the basic
ideas of justice?
For instances of horrible brutality and inhumane acts, says the court, the issue to
dwell upon is not the knowledge (because such knowledge is obviously present), but
rather the test of whether the moral choice was possible. 33 The negative answer to this
question may serve in mitigation of the punishment. Such reference to moral choice was
first suggested at the Trial of Major War Criminals in Nuremberg. This principle is
known as one of the Nuremberg Principles affirmed by the UN Assembly Resolution of
11.12.46 34. The court in Eichmann recognizes that the Tribunal did not specify the
meaning of the expression ‘moral choice’35 The suggested interpretation is that in the
given circumstances there existed an element of coercion, or constraint, leading to the
conclusion that unless the accused followed the order he would be subject to execution. 36
As the court points out, this invokes two other inquiries presented in the case U.S. v.
Olendorf. 37 First, the threat to life must be imminent, real and inevitable. Second, the
question is “whether the subordinate acted under the coercion or whether he himself
approved of the principle involved in the order” 38 In case if the subordinate approved the
underlying principle of the unlawful order, the defense of superior orders fails since the
will of the doer merges with the will of the superior in the execution of the illegal act.” 39
Here the court determining the possible mitigation of punishment for Eichmann comes to
the conclusion that mitigation will not be available for the accused because “he
performed the order of extermination at all times…with genuine zeal and devotion to that
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objective.” 40 The Eichmann case presents an interesting, but failed attempt to invoke the
doctrine of superior orders for the defense of the accused, or in mitigation of his
punishment. Here the court correctly rejected availability of the superior orders defense
to Eichmann who was clearly among the masterminds in the most shocking and
outrageous murders of World War II.
Another example when the superior orders defense was used is the notorious trial
of Lieutenant William Calley, “the man who ordered the massacre of My Lai civilians.”41
In order to picture Calley’s trial and his defense we should recount some
circumstances surrounding the May Lai massacre. Charlie Company was the detachment
where Calley served as one of the platoon leaders. 42 The commanding officer of Charlie
Company was Ernest Medina. 43 Calley’s subordinates described him as incompetent,
“nervous, excitable type who yelled a lot”, “a glory-hungry person…the kind of person
who would have sacrificed all of us for his own personal advancement”. 44 None of the
men had any respect for him as a military leader. Even Captain Medina himself would
often address Calley in a derogatory manner calling him “Lieutenant Shithead.” 45
One soldier said “if they wanted to do something wrong it was alright with Calley.”46 The
night before the My Lai tragedy, Captain Medina told the soldiers that the VC’s battalion
is to become the target of a large-scale assault. In the morning before the assault, Medina
allegedly added that “the women and children would be out of the village and all they
could expect to encounter would be the enemy” 47 Medina later claimed that he did not
give any instructions as to what to do with the women and children in the village. Some
soldiers agreed with such recollection, but others clearly thought that Medina ordered
them to kill every person in My Lai. 48 Thus, there are contradicting opinions on what
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exactly were the commands from Medina regarding the civilian population of the village.
The author Professor Linder suggests that Medina’s orders were intentionally vague. 49 I
agree with the author’s point of view that Medina purposely gave the impression that
everyone in My Lai would be their enemy. 50 Later in his testimony at Calley’s trial
Medina responding to the question about the instructions he had given the soldiers
claimed: “One of the questions that was asked of me at the briefing was, “Do we kill
women and children?” My reply to that question was: No, you do not kill women and
children. You must use common sense. If they have a weapon and are trying to engage
you, when you can shoot back, but you must use common sense” 51 In my opinion, this
suggests that Medina deliberately made such statements as if implying the high
probability of women and children actually intending to use weapon against the
American forces. As we now know, and as they should have known then, there were no
such attempts from the unarmed civilian population of My Lai. I think, this idea to expect
resistance at any time was intentionally planted in the minds of the soldiers so that they
would be less hesitant about their actions. This is reflected in the following exchange
between Paul Meadlo and Aubrey Daniel, the prosecutor at the Calley trial:
Q: The women, the children and babies were sitting down? A: Yes. Q: Did they attack
you? A: I assumed at every minute that they would counterbalance. I thought they had
some sort of chain or a little string they had to give a little pull and they blow us up,
things like that. 52
From this testimony we can see that Meadlo claims he was constantly expecting a
counter attack, even from the most unprotected peaceful civilians of My Lai, - women
and infants. However, this contention is absolutely unfounded and ridiculous to any
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reasonable person. If despite its controversy and amazing absurdity we consider the
Meadlo statement as his true belief, it raises two issues. First, perhaps, this is the proof
that Captain Medina did successfully convince soldiers to regard anyone in My Lai as an
enemy who can strike back at any time. The other issue raised from this testimony is how
is it possible that soldiers like Meadlo (and it seems that the majority of them were like
Meadlo) followed such a flagrantly unlawful order. There was not a single sentence in the
testimony where Meadlo indicated his disagreement or questioned in any way the
horrible orders which he obediently followed. Nothing in the testimony suggests that he
questioned the orders. The reasoning is “we suspected them of being Viet Cong… And as
far as I am concerned they’re still Viet Cong” 53 Such statement hardly is a justification
for committing one of the most aggravated massacres of the civilian population in the
history of mankind. Naturally, villagers of My Lai were Vietnamese by origin, however
this does not and should not automatically transfer them into the status of the enemy
combatants or in any way disqualify the peaceful unarmed population from the necessity
to be protected in the conflict. To accept Meadlo’s statement means to completely
undermine all the doctrines in International Criminal law related to the humane treatment
of civilian population or prisoners, because all such population and prisoners will
definitely belong to the nation which is the opposing party to the military conflict. Then if
you give them the same status as the active combatants of opposing army, (a wrong
proposition even to begin with) it would undermine any need for protection of the
peaceful civilians making such need undesired and unnecessary. So it looks like it was
merely an artificial justification in the minds of the soldiers which would allow them to
commit mass murder without questioning the flagrantly unlawful orders they received.
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This is how Meadlo describes the orders and his reaction: “I shot the Viet Cong. he
[Calley] ordered me to help kill people. I started shoving them off and shooting…” 54
On one occasion Meadlo said he was scared and frightened to carry out the orders,
“because nobody really wants to take a human being’s life.” 55 Also at some point
Meadlo said: “I didn't have my orders to kill them. It ain't my reason to figure what they
was going to do with them. It was just natural procedure to hold them for questioning.”56
This was his answer to the question why he did not kill the people earlier. From his
statement we see that even in Meadlo’s mind there were certain things that are expected
to happen when you capture a group of civilians. He at first assumed he was supposed to
guard the captured and in his testimony referred to the “natural procedure”. The order to
slaughter a helpless group of innocent civilians was not something that he expected to
have been ordered. Why did he not disobey these horrible orders? Maybe the soldier did
not know he could disobey, more likely is that he did not dare or simply acted as he was
trained in the army. Perhaps he made his moral choice – to obey the orders, the
manifestly illegal and as Judge Halevy defined it, the order unlawfulness of which
“pierces and agitates the heart.” 57
Now I will consider the details of defense attempted in Calley’s trial by his
counsel, George Latimer. 58 In the direct examination from the start Latimer asks Calley
whether he learned anything about the Geneva Convention. 59 To this Calley responded
that nothing from these classes stands in his mind. Then, Latimer inquired what Calley
knew about obedience to orders. Here Calley attempted to portray himself as a diligent
army trainee claiming that he was aware that he could be court-martialed for refusing the
order and if the disobedience occurred in the face of the enemy he could be sent to death.
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He also said he never was told he had a choice not to obey the orders. So from such
exchange we can see how Latimer early in his defense strategy tries to depict an innocent
and obedient soldier who is aware of his responsibility to follow orders without
questioning. The following answer brings up another interesting point: “If I had—
questioned the order, I was supposed to carry the order out and then come back and make
my complaint. Later.” 60 So even if there was an order from Medina to kill all the
civilians in the My Lai village, according to Calley himself instructions were given to
him on multiple occasions: “the night before the company briefing, platoon leaders’
briefing, the following morning… and twice there in the village…” Calley had plenty of
occasions to address his concerns if he had any well before the start of the brutal military
actions in My Lai.
The testimony of some of Calley’s subordinates, however, revealed that no
particular orders were given by Captain Medina to murder the innocent civilians and
most of the brutal killings were actually initiated by Calley himself. 61 Although the
orders of Medina himself are not a particularly a clear issue due to the conflicting
testimony and different points of view among the authors. For example, author Green
states that “Captain Medina was alleged to have issued the order in compliance with
which the massacre of My Lai was perpetrated, and who confessed that he subsequently
knew of the outrage, but decided to hush it up instead of taking steps to punish those
responsible therefore or report its perpetration.” 62
It is evident through the many descriptions of the events in My Lai that Lieutenant
Calley, being a platoon leader, himself exercised his own authority during the murderous
assault. Other soldiers, like Paul Meadlo, Dennis Conti, Robert Maples were actually
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Calley’s subordinates and were supposed to follow Calley’s orders. They later testified at
Calley’s trial for the prosecution. Interestingly, both Conti and Maples revealed in their
testimony that they refused to follow the orders of Calley. 63 In particular, Maples
recollects that when he was told by Calley to use the machine gun on the women and
children gathered in the ditch, the former refused. 64 In his testimony, Dennis Conti
similarly refused to open direct fire at the helpless group of villagers gathered in the
ditch. Conti recalled that Meadlo who followed Calley’s orders “fired a little bit and
broke down. He was crying. He said he couldn't do any more. He couldn't kill anymore
people. He couldn't fire into the people any more. He gave me his weapon into my hands.
I said I wouldn't. "If they're going to be killed, I'm not going to do it. Let Lieutenant
Calley do it, I told him. So I gave Meadlo back his weapon. At that time there was only a
few kids still alive Lieutenant Calley killed them one-by-one.” 65
From this statement we can see that some soldiers in fact did exercise their right
to moral choice and refused to kill the unarmed civilians in the ditch. On contrary, Calley
himself committed the murders of women, children, infants and the elderly with zeal and
vehemence. At his trial he was the one attempting to adhere to the defense of superior
orders. If anyone, it could have been the soldiers under Calley’s command who perhaps
would have been fairly entitled to the defense of superior orders.
If we compare the two trials from the different historical periods, - the trial of
Adolf Eichmann and the trial of William Calley, we can find certain similarities. Both of
these criminals turned to the defense of superior orders whereas the accused themselves
were in fact at a certain (higher in the case of Eichmann) level of authority in the military
chain of command. The courts in both cases having correctly assessed the surrounding
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circumstances did not allow such defense. The reasons given by the courts are similar. In
the Eichmann case the court emphasized the fact that Eichmann knew about the illegality
of his actions. Also the court noted this was “…a weighty reason to repudiate the above
defence as one which relieves from responsibility in cases of this kind.” 66 The other
reason the court gave in Eichmann for refusing superior orders defense to the defendant is
“that the very commission of the crimes in question necessarily points to the existence of
criminal intent in the perpetrator.” 67
The United States Court of Military Appeals addressed the superior orders
defense issue in the similar manner. In the appeal process, the judge first stated that
Captain Medina denied issuing any such order at any time, however, the court claims that
the conflict between Calley’s and Medina’s testimonies is irrelevant in respect to the
suggested defense. 68 The judge reminds that the jury at trial had been instructed as
follows: “Unless you find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted with actual
knowledge that the order was unlawful, you must proceed to determine whether, under
the circumstances, a man of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the
order was unlawful. Your deliberations on this question do not focus on Lieutenant
Calley and the manner in which he perceived the legality of the order found to have been
given him. The standard is that of a man of ordinary sense and understanding under the
circumstances.” 69 Then the jurors were instructed to decide whether the allegedly given
order was in fact unlawful as the suggested test requires. Further jurors were to apply this
to each charged act which they found Calley to have committed. 70 The appellate defense
counsel suggested that such jury instructions are “prejudicially erroneous” and proposed
to adopt a different test, “whether the order is so palpably or manifestly illegal that the
16
person of ‘the commonest understanding’ would be aware of its illegality.” 71 However,
as the court further noted even this proposed change in the test applied in the case will
not provide remedy to the accused: “An order to kill infants and unarmed civilians who
were so demonstrably incapable of resistance to the armed might of a military force as
were those killed by Lieutenant Calley, is in my opinion, so palpably illegal that whatever
conceptional difference there may be between a person of ‘commonest understanding’
and …of ‘common understanding’ that the difference could not have had any impact on a
court”72
Indeed, the illegality of the military actions and the horrors that surround the
tragic events in My Lai are evident to any individual, no matter what level or what degree
of the test is applied. This is reflected in the reaction of many soldiers during the
massacre, when one soldier deliberately shot himself in the leg in order to avoid carrying
out Calley’s orders, others ( like Conti) refused to shoot, and others (like Meadlo)
followed the order at first, but could not overcome his emotions and did not continue. In
addition, the appellate court noted: “Conceding for the purposes of this assignment of
error that Calley believed the villagers were part of "the enemy," the uncontradicted
evidence is that they were under the control of armed soldiers and were offering no
resistance. 73 In his testimony, Calley admitted he was aware of the requirement that
prisoners be treated with respect. He also admitted he knew that the normal practice was
to interrogate villagers, release those who could satisfactorily account for themselves, and
evacuate the suspect among them for further examination.74 “Instead of proceeding in the
usual way Calley executed all, without regard to age, condition, or possibility of
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suspicion. On the evidence, the court-martial could reasonably find Calley guilty of the
offenses before us.” 74
So, we can conclude that the court in consideration of availability of the superior
orders defense for the perpetrator Lt. Calley, similarly to the court in the Eichmann’s
case, dwelt upon illegality of the actions known to the accused. However, unlike in
Eichmann, the court did not elaborate on the issue of intent in Calley’s case. The intent
was mentioned by the prosecutor Aubrey Daniels in the summation where he in particular
noted that first the accused presence of intention is proved by the fact that he was
standing up over a group of people with his rifle and pulled the trigger aiming straight at
them. Another factor that Daniels considers to prove intent is the fact that Calley
specifically stated in regard to the group of civilians “I want them dead” and “waste
them” to his soldiers. 75
In his discussion of the My Lai massacre Professor Linder says that two tragedies
happened, - one is the massacre of the innocent civilians, and the other, - the cover up. 76
In my opinion, there was a third one. It is the fact that none of the perpetrators received
the adequate punishment and that till nowadays the man who is responsible for the deaths
of hundreds of innocent civilians, - including women and children, happily enjoys his life
running a jewelry store. Professor Linder in his work describes the circumstances of the
trials in connection with the My Lai massacre. According to the author, initially it was
decided to prosecute a total of twenty five officers and enlisted men. 77 However, very
few of them in fact were tried and only one of these people, Calley was convicted. As the
author points out “most of the enlisted men who committed war crimes were no longer
members of the military, and thus immune from prosecution by court-martial.” 78 It was
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decided to prosecute some of the higher rank commanders as well. Among them were
Captain Medina, General Koster, Colonel Henderson. The top officer, Koster was
charged for failing to report known civilian casualties and conducting an obviously
inadequate investigation which seems to have been aimed at covering up the murders.
Charges against Koster were dropped; thus he only received a letter of censure and
reduction in rank. 79 Colonel Henderson in his investigation of the massacre made no
attempt to interview the surviving Vietnamese witnesses, but remained satisfied with the
answers of a number of the soldiers. In his written report he announced that the number
of victims accidentally killed at My Lai was twenty civilians. A trial by court martial
found Colonel Henderson not guilty on all charges.80 Other sources claim that
“the battalion commander, a Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, had been killed in a
helicopter crash after the events at My Lai occurred.” 81
These trials of the top military commanders clearly indicate how difficult and
almost impossible it is to hold the commanders responsible when they fail to act in
situations when their intervention is needed the most. It should be those investigations in
particular if conducted by the commanders promptly and adequately that can shed light
on the war crimes and provide a future fair outcome when each perpetrator receives what
they really deserve. Also, Medina’s own trial revealed that proving existence of the
unlawful order is rather challenging.
From the testimonies of some soldiers it is clear that Capitan Medina was present
either during the horrific events or shortly thereafter. Meadlo in his testimony during
Calley’s trial recalls responding to the question whether he saw Captain Medina: “Yes.
And he didn't say anything and did not even try to put a stop to it. So I figured we was
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doing the right thing.”82 If that is the case and Captain Medina was present during the
massacre, even if he did not give direct orders to kill the innocent civilians, he is still
responsible for the crime, since he did nothing to prevent the murders and stop the
atrocities that were being committed by his subordinates. It was his duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility in the international criminal law to stop the slaughter,
punish the perpetrators and properly report the violations. Indeed, Medina was later
charged with the “premeditated murder” of at least one hundred civilians. His other
charges included the murder of a woman and a child and the assault of a prisoner.83
However, the Jury considered that the evidence to establish his guilt was
insufficient and Medina was acquitted on all charges. Subsequently, when a perjury
prosecution was no longer possible, Medina did, in fact, admit that he had suppressed
evidence and lied to the brigade commander about the number of civilians killed.84 Thus,
lying under oath allowed one of the perpetrators, responsible for mass murders, escaped
punishment.
Calley himself who was initially convicted to life imprisonment, nevertheless,
due to the pressure from public who viewed him as a ‘scapegoat’ had his sentence
significantly reduced and consequently ended up spending only three years under home
arrest and was subsequently pardoned by President Nixon.85 It is hard to describe what I
feel when I look at the pictures of the My Lai massacre and imagine that one of the key
murderers who in cold blood slaughtered helpless children, infants, women and the
elderly civilians on March 16, 1968; the criminal who kept insisting throughout the whole
trial that he believes he was doing the right thing, still walks the earth, unpunished.
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I think there should have been more trials, and the efforts to bring the guilty to
justice should have been more systematic, so that public opinion would not protect
Calley, the only one convicted in connection with the massacre, viewed as a scapegoat
and whose status in the trial’s aftermath elevated almost to one of a hero’s. Even though
the trial itself received public attention should have been exposed in a more detailed way
in regards to the atrocities committed by the perpetrators with emphasis on the victims
including the thorough recount of the events by the participants. Perhaps, the public
should have been shown the testimonies of the soldiers with a description of all the
details surrounding the massacre and particular acts of murder committed by each soldier.
Thus society would be able to form its own opinion regarding the events and would feel
strongly about the innocent victims, thus becoming concerned with the outcome of the
trials. Also if the commanders from of the higher ranks such as Captain Medina were
actually convicted, the overall outcome from Calley’s trial perhaps would have been
much different.
I realize, however, that the My Lai massacre occurred within the frames of a
much debated and controversial war, and perhaps in the minds of a lot, any further
complications and trials were not the most preferred way to handle the situation. In the
circumstances surrounding Lt. Calley’s trial, even though the defense of superior orders
was not accepted by the court, the perpetrator, initially convicted to life imprisonment
managed to escape the fair punishment as a result of the political and societal pressure.
The most recent trial I will consider in connection with the defense of superior
orders is the trial of Lynndie England relating to the prisoner abuse scandal in the Abu
Ghraib prison. According to many sources, Army Pfc. Lynndie England’s smiling poses
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in photos of detainee abuse at Baghdad’s Abu Ghraib prison made her the face of the
scandal.86 She appeared in many notorious photographs of the abuse: in one holding a
naked prisoner on the leash, in the others – pointing at the detainees who were put in
humiliating positions. At the early stages of the trial England and her military defense
attorney, Jonathan Crisp, in the public statement claimed she was ordered to abuse the
detainees and take pictures of the mistreatment with the purpose to soften up prisoners for
future interrogation by the intelligence personnel of the U.S.87 England’s defense attorney
further explained that her actions were a part of a larger army plan to “set the conditions
for interrogations.”88 Supposedly this strategy was developed by Major General Geoffrey
Miller, who at first headed the prison at Guantanamo Bay and then took over Abu
Ghraib.89 Allegedly this strategy also involved prisoner sleep deprivation, strange meal
patterns, stress positions and other psychological means to break down the detainees and
make them talk.90 The criminal army investigator mentioned there was some confusion
among the soldiers on how far they are allowed to go to soften the detainees. 91 However,
it was clear since the early stage of the trial that the superior orders defense would turn
problematic for England to follow.
There are several reasons that cause this difficulty. Rule 916 of the Manual for
Court Martial says that the superior orders defense is acceptable unless the accused knew
that the orders were unlawful, or a “person of ordinary sense and understanding would
have known the orders to be unlawful.”92 It is hard to imagine that England did not
realize the unlawfulness of her actions. The abuse in which she participated is clearly a
violation of the law and one does not need a legal background or sophistication to
understand that. The illegal nature of her actions is palpable. Another reason is the
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statements of her fellow soldiers. In fact none of the officers or soldiers in Abu Ghraib
indicated that such orders existed.93 Interestingly the defense team originally planned to
request permission of fifty additional witnesses to testify at the pre-trial hearing, whose
testimony would contribute to Lynndie England’s defense of superior orders. Such
potential witnesses included Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, former top commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez and Military Police Brigade
commander Janis Karpinski.94 However; the presiding officer at the hearing, Colonel
Denise Arn rejected the request.95 England’s civilian attorney, Hernandez made the
following statement in regard to the abuse scandal: “This is clearly something that went
beyond this particular individual.” 96 The military police sergeant testifying for the
defense said he had seen two military intelligence agents abusing prisoners and ordering
the abuse to Pvt. Graner who had been considered a ringleader of the abuse. 97 According
to the requirements for the selected defense, England was also supposed to name the
commander who gave this order, but instead she changed her tactic. Despite her initial
contentions and resort to superior orders defense, England abandoned that defense saying
that the pictures were taken with the purpose to amuse the prison guards and that she was
trying to please her soldier boyfriend by participating in the detainee abuse. 98 Still,
throughout England’s trial the mass media reported statements from different sources,
mainly from her defense team and family members that Lynndie was a scapegoat and in
reality she is merely an obedient and trusting follower of the others’ initiatives who gave
in to the peer pressure. She depicted herself as being manipulated and used by her older
peer Graner, with whom she was in love. 99
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England was convicted of one count of conspiracy, four counts of maltreating
detainees and one count of committing an indecent act and sentenced to three years in
prison.100 Several officers received administrative punishment, but none have gone to
trial until recently. On April 28, 2006 the US military charged Lt.-Col. Steven Jordan, the
former head of the Interrogation Center at Abu Ghraib with seven offenses including
mistreatment of the detainees.101 Jordan is the highest ranking officer to face criminal
charges in connection with the prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib. According to a BBC
correspondent there is still anger that no one in the administration took responsibility for
the abuse.102 And while the outcome of Jordan’s trial is hard to predict, if convicted,
Jordan may become the first on the future list of military elite responsible for the abuse.
It seems that one serious problem arises in the context of England’s case. In
particular, even if there were certain orders from the top military commanders, it is highly
unlikely that the current administration would be willing to charge any top commander
with the abuse. It seems unlikely that the administration, which has been meticulously
protective of its commanders throughout the war in Iraq, would suddenly turn to its top
military officials and agents to indict any such individual, because the responsibility
could be traced to someone at the top of the hierarchy reaching as high as the President or
his ministers.
It is also possible that there were no direct orders to mistreat the prisoners, but the
overall atmosphere of chaos, vagueness and ambiguity of instructions as well as frequent
calls for “the softening up” of the detainees contributed to the abuse. Another possibility
is that the prisoner abuses occurred due to the unhealthy moral atmosphere of
permissiveness, where the soldiers knew they could do anything they wanted and perhaps
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even proudly brag about their acts of detainee humiliation to their superiors without
fearing punishment from the commanders but instead expecting encouragement.
Hopefully, Jordan’s upcoming trial will shed some light on these issues.
The circumstances surrounding the three trials I discussed have some common
features. First, the crimes committed by the perpetrators occurred in the context of the
troubling military situations, - World War II in Eichmann’s case, the Vietnam War in
Calley’s and the War in Iraq in Lynndie England’s. There was an underlying government
policy that formed and to a certain extent contributed to the acts of the accused. The
influence and adherence to such policy is commensurate with the position of the accused,
greater in the cases of a high rank officer, like Eichmann, and lesser for the foot soldier,
like England. Interestingly in the last two cases, where the perpetrators, Lt. Calley and
Pvt. England, were at the lower level of the military hierarchy, the public suggested the
possibility of them serving as scapegoats especially since none of the higher ranking
officers received an adequate punishment at the time.
Second, each one of the perpetrators could still exercise their moral choice,
discussed by the court in Eichmann’s case, however they failed to do so.103 The defense
of superior orders was rejected by the courts in the Eichmann’s and Calley’s case. Both
these criminals were in a commanding position and in fact they were the ones who gave
the orders to the soldiers to execute the innocent victims. Therefore their attempt to resort
to the superior orders defense seems more outrageous. If any, it should have been the
subordinates of Eichmann’s and Calley’s who could try to use such defense in mitigation
of their punishment. Another reason why superior orders defense did not apply to these
criminals is the fact that they had a moral choice. Instead, both perpetrators committed
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their crimes eagerly and zealously. Meanwhile, especially in Calley’s case others chose
not to follow the illegal acts. One example is Hugh Thompson, the true hero of My Lai
who landed his helicopter between the group of the wounded civilians and Calley’s
soldiers. Thompson ordered his people to protect the helpless group and even open fire if
anyone from the US Army tried to kill the civilians.104 He exercised his moral choice. It
was a simple and humane decision, the only proper action in the given circumstances.
Thompson, like everybody else fought in the Vietnam War, but, unlike many, he was able
to remain true to himself and did not betray his consciousness. He saw the obvious
illegality of the events and fulfilled his duty both as a soldier and a human being. Some
other soldiers from Calley’s group also refused to shoot at the civilians, one even
intentionally shot himself in the leg. This is the moral choice exhibited in the midst of the
atrocious war.
Did Lynndie England have a moral choice? The answer seems palpable. Despite
her contentions that her participation in the photos was not completely voluntary but
rather influenced by her boyfriend, it seems that England was engaged in the prisoner
abuse with enthusiasm and eagerness. So if all the three perpetrators were allowed the
superior orders defense and the moral choice were to serve as the threshold test, none of
the perpetrators discussed above would be able to benefit from this defense, because none
of them exercised their choice to prevent the outrageous crimes.
Also due to the difference in the army ranks of the perpetrators we find them at
various levels of the military hierarchy; and their extent of participation in the existing
overall scheme against the victims differs. The more favorable the situation is to Lynndie
England, who simply was a foot soldier of the lower rank. In all three cases there seems
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to have been either a pronounced or unspoken policy in regards to the perpetrator’s
victims. In Eichmann’s case the killing of the Jews became a state policy promoted by
Hitler. In Calley’s case the massacre of the Vietnamese occurred in the context of the
Vietnam War where oftentimes commanders encouraged to consider everyone, including
women and children, an enemy. In England’s trial the background atmosphere is more
subtle and secretive. Several sources point at the existence of some secret order by top
ranking authorities. In particular, according to Pvt. Graner’s attorney, the treatment of
detainees at Abu Ghraib “was being controlled and devised by the military intelligence
community and other governmental agencies, including the CIA.” 105 So if an order of
such kind did exist, Pvt. England would still have difficulty fulfilling the requirement for
the superior orders defense, to name the person who ordered the abuse. It seems that the
atmosphere in Abu Ghraib in the midst of the war and general disposition of the public
and soldiers towards the captured Iraqis was not favorable, where the attitude towards the
Iraqi prisoners is far from sympathetic.
Interestingly, the three discussed perpetrators attempted to use the defense of
superior orders in their trials, but at the end turned to other defenses. The court in
Eichmann simply rejected such attempt, Calley was not able to provide proof of the
existence of the order allegedly given by his superior since Medina was acquitted at his
own trial; and the circumstances of England’s trial involved the change in her defense
team’s strategy and a subsequent plea deal.
In my opinion, it is crucial that each soldier, especially those involved in the
armed conflict, be properly explained and repeatedly instructed that if they receive an
order which is clearly illegal, they are not only allowed, but in fact are required to
27
disobey such order. Each case that arises in connection with superior orders should be
considered individually on its merits. The legal history has established requirements and
provided us with a distinctive and precise mechanism for application of the superior
orders defense. This will assist the courts in the future for consideration of such defense.
Although it is hard to tell how many future perpetrators are going to turn to the defense of
superior orders, each and every one of them should realize that this defense was not
created to provide an easy escape for the malevolent military criminals from
responsibility. I agree with Wilner who stated: “Having once recognized that the duty of
obedience to superiors has some reasonable and prescribed limitations, that standard, in
the name of all humanity, cannot logically or morally be abandoned.” 106 This statement
calls for the exercise of moral choice by each soldier. By this moment we have witnessed
too many shocking incidents of war crimes. Adherence to the traditionally developed test
of manifest illegality in combination with individual moral standards will hopefully
prevent future tragedies and war crimes.
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